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Abstract 
Introduction 
A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and explosive (CBRNe) event is an 
emergency which can result in injury, illness, or loss of life. The Emergency Department (ED) 
as a health system is at the forefront of the CBRNe response with staff acting as first 
receivers. EDs are underprepared to respond to CBRNe events - recognising key factors 
which underlie the ED CBRNe response is crucial to provide evidence-based knowledge to 
inform policies and most importantly clinical practice. 
Problem 
Challenges in detection, decontamination and diagnosis are associated with the ED CBRNe 
response when faced with self-presenting patients. 
Methods 
A systematic review was carried out in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). An in-depth search strategy was devised 
to identify studies which focused on the ED and CBRNe events. The inclusion criteria was 
stringent in terms of the environment (ED), participants (first receivers), situation (CBRNe 
response), and actions (detection, decontamination and diagnosis). Fifteen databases and 
topic-specific journals were searched. Studies were critically appraised using the Mixed 
Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT). Papers were thematically coded and synthesised using 
NVivo 10. 
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Results  
Sixty-seven full-text papers were critically appraised using the MMAT; 70% were included 
(n=60) as medium or high quality studies. Data were grouped into 4 themes: preparedness, 
response, decontamination, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) problems.   
Discussion 
This study has recognised the ED as a system which depends on four key factors -
preparedness, response, decontamination, and PPE problems which highlight challenges, 
uncertainties, inconsistencies, and obstacles associated with the ED CBRNe response. This 
review suggests that response planning and preparation should be considered at three levels: 
organisational (policies and procedures); technological (decontamination, communication, 
security, clinical care, and treatment); and individual (willingness to respond, PPE, 
knowledge, and competence). Finally, this study highlighted that there was a void specific to 
detection and diagnosis of CBRNe exposure on self-presenting patients in the ED.  
Conclusion 
The review identified concerns for both knowledge and behaviours which suggests that a 
systems approach would help understand the ED response to CBRNe events more effectively. 
The four themes provide an evidence-based summary for the state of science in ED CBRNe 
response which can be used to inform future policies and clinical procedures.   
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Introduction 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and explosive (CBRNe) events occur through 
natural, accidental, and deliberate means 
1
. CBRNe events present a threat to human welfare 
by causing, or having potential to cause, injury, illness, or loss of life and can result in a large 
number of casualties.  
Emergency Departments (EDs) have statutory duties and responsibilities to prepare, plan, and 
respond to CBRNe events adequately 
2
. EDs are at the forefront of the CBRNe response and 
serve as the gateway to the most appropriate care of patients 
3
.  In particular employees 
within the ED are often considered a subset of first responders in such incidents 
4,5
. ED staff 
are termed ‘first receivers’ 
6
 and  include doctors, nurses, allied healthcare professionals, and 
non-clinical staff for initial recognition (receptionists); cordon control (security); and general 
support (estates/porters) during the CBRNe response 
7
. 
The problem 
Patients arrive at the ED by ambulance or self-presentation. If they have been brought in by 
an ambulance they receive a medical assessment and care by paramedics whilst waiting to be 
allocated an ED cubicle. Patients who self-present are not provided with this assessment or 
care 
8
.  This introduces challenges in the ED CBRNe response, particularly in terms of 
detection of a contaminant on a self-presenting patient at the ED triage or waiting area 
6
. 
Another associated challenge related to self-presenters and the ED response is 
decontamination, defined as “the reduction or removal of harmful substances from the body” 
9
; this is an area of ambiguity and is negatively associated with the donning of PPE. Finally, 
the diagnosis of CBRNe related symptoms is difficult due to the rarity of  these events and 
similarity with other diseases making exposure difficult to diagnose 
10
.  
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EDs are underprepared to efficiently respond to CBRNe events 
11–15
. Previous research has 
focused on training, namely doctors and nurses 
5,16
 to overcome unpreparedness. Training as 
the sole means of enhancing the ED CBRNe response is questionable because obstacles such 
as short staffing and constant staff turnover arise 
6
. The purpose of this review was to scope 
the ED CBRNe response with respect to detection, decontamination, and diagnosis of self-
presenting patients to identify key factors which can inform future policies and clinical 
procedures. 
Report 
Method 
The seven-stage framework was used in line with the PRISMA statement (www.prisma-
statement.org). This provides structured guidance on the development of appropriate research 
questions, as well as on the eligibility of search criteria, and the identification, selection, 
retrieval, appraisal, and synthesis of relevant papers according to title and abstract. 
Research question: What is known about the ED CBRNe response with respect to detection, 
decontamination, and diagnosis of self-presenting patients? 
Eligibility: References were screened at the first stage by setting the database parameters to 
all languages (English abstract), post 2001, worldwide, and any study type.  
Search: The search started by scoping and exploring concepts related to the research question. 
An initial set of keywords was tested in BNI (NHS evidence) and Google Scholar using the 
string searches in Figure 1. The results were reviewed for relevance, and additional keywords 
were added from retrieved references. The search was divided into four areas to combine 
concepts of environment (A), areas of exploration (A + B), context (A + B + C) and types of 
patients (A + B + C + D).  
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A.  Emergency Department, Accident and Emergency and Emergency Room. 
B.  Detection, decontamination, and diagnosis. 
C.  CBRNe, CBRN, Mass-casualty Incidents, and MCI. 
D.  Walking wounded, priority 3 (P3; mobile with minor injuries), and self-presenters. 
Figure 1 
The search was run on 15 databases: ProQuest, ASSIA, BNI (NHS Evidence), Chemical 
Database service, Ergonomics Abstracts, Google Scholar, Health Management Technology 
(EBSCO), Medline (Ovid SP), PsychInfo (EBSCO), Referex (Materials and Mechanical 
Engineering), SAE digital library, Scopus (Elsevier), Science Direct, Toxline and Web of 
Science. Additional searches were run in topic-specific journals e.g. Journal of Breath 
Research and Trends in Analytical Chemistry as shown in Table 1. 
Identification of relevant papers (inclusion/exclusion): Papers were included where they 
reported research in ED (only); ED staff (including surgeons, anaesthetists, operational 
managers, and ED Chiefs); mass-casualty incident by the intentional release of CBRNe 
materials, ED triaging; and detection, decontamination, and diagnosis in ED including 
donning PPE. Papers were excluded from guidelines, textbooks and grey literature. Scientific 
studies of the effects of CBRNe materials, i.e. physiological and chemical pathways, were 
excluded. Psychological or psychosocial effects of CBRNe incidents were excluded. Finally, 
research reporting on activity in hot zones was excluded. 
Selection and retrieval: The search identified 1,874 papers which were screened by title and 
abstract, and checked for duplication, resulting in 366 papers. Articles that did not adhere to 
the inclusion criteria were disregarded whilst simultaneously adding (23) relevant studies 
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through manual citation searches. This resulted in the quality of 67 articles being assessed 
with the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT). 
Appraisal: The included papers (n=67) were appraised using the MMAT
17
 to assign a quality 
score on a 5 point scale from 0 to 4 (100% of criteria met). Seven papers scoring 0 or 1 
(<25%) were discarded, as the quality was too poor for inclusion. This resulted in a final 
number of sixty studies (Figure 2). 
Synthesis: The residual studies (n=60) were retained for qualitative synthesis. There were 4 
emerging themes of CBRNe preparedness (n= 38), response (n= 29), decontamination (n= 9), 
and PPE problems (n= 9). Some papers provided information for more than one theme. 
Results 
Papers were included from 12 countries: USA, UK, Israel, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Turkey, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Spain. The methodological quality of the 
included papers were mostly medium and strong (Table 2, supplementary online material).  A 
quantitative synthesis was not carried out based on the variation in study types, sample 
populations, study aims, and multi-faceted nature of CBRNe events. 
Figure 2 
Included papers were coded in Nvivo 10 (QSR International Ltd, Melbourne, Australia), for 
thematic analysis. Overlapping themes between studies were coded and then grouped into 
main themes, which highlighted key factors relevant to the research question, as outlined 
below. 
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Preparedness 
Preparedness was associated with a post-9-11 shift in thinking 
18,19
  which forced  EDs to 
examine and update their emergency disaster preparedness plans 
20
. Such as dividing ED 
CBRNe preparedness into two domains- departmental and individual
5
.  
This systematic review identified the ED as a system and preparedness consisting of three 
inter-twining levels: organisation, technology, and individual (see Table 3).  With studies 
reporting research on organisational preparedness to provide timely and high standard care to 
patients 
5,13,21,22
 particularly emphasising standardised measures 
16,23
competencies 
24,25
 and 
standards
13
 for  ED CBRNe preparedness.  
Technology-related preparedness both includes and highlights limitations in communication 
systems to co-ordinate the CBRNe response 
26
; mainly the unreliability of mobile phones and 
walkie-talkies, due to reception difficulties particularly when surrounded by certain materials. 
Additionally, computer-based decision-support systems were anticipated to be overwhelmed 
due to the surge in patients, resulting in a preference for manual pen-paper methods 
27,28
. 
Individual preparedness was associated with the perceptions, perspectives, views, and 
information needs of first receivers which affected their capacity to respond to CBRNe events 
29,30
. 
In addition to communication issues, there was also evidence that EDs lack preparedness 
(including capacity) for decontamination, security, appropriate equipment, antidotes, and 
treatment equipment incapacities 
12,22,31,32
. Furthermore one study suggested that the 
limitations in the ED CBRNe response was a reflection of overall hospital preparedness 
33
. 
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Response 
Numerous studies reported on individual staff skills or preferences in responding to a CBRNe 
event. By which the response was determined by the individual first receivers’ willingness to 
respond to a CBRNe event. Individual willingness to respond varied based on the type of 
event with the majority of first receivers more willing to respond to disasters such as an 
aeroplane crash, in comparison to radioactive or biological exposure 
34
,
35
 . Nonetheless, 
willingness to respond was found to be high for Chemical, Biological, and  Radiological 
events amongst ED nurses with postgraduate qualifications however this willingness to 
respond to CBR exposure decreased significantly if the substances were unknown 
30
.  
Studies reported a number of solutions to enhance the ED CBRNe response, including 
creating surge capacity 
21,36
- which is the hospitals ability to accommodate a transient sudden 
rise in demand for healthcare following an event 
21,36
. Implementing specific triage routes 
(time and sequence for patient management) have been proposed to create surge capacity 
37,38
 
as well as applying actions such as a decrease in n w admissions, discharge of patients earlier, 
cancelling elective surgeries, organising day care for children of staff, and designating victim 
flow areas 
11,39,40
. Surge capacity was however, suggested to be restricted by the failure to 
fully integrate interagency training, planning, and co-ordination
 11,21,36
. 
Decontamination 
The importance of effective decontamination within the ED was emphasised by a number of 
studies 
13,41,42
. They suggested it was imperative for EDs to have the appropriate facilities, 
equipment, and capability to respond to CBRNe exposure.  
Decontamination challenges related to knowledge and facilities were reported for PPE, 
clinical waste management, and decontamination timescales 
5,43,44
. Variation existed between 
studies in terms of having the facilities to physically decontaminate patients. For example, 
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some EDs had designated areas for decontamination 
13,45
 but could not manage a serious 
chemical incident as a result of lack of equipment. Other studies highlighted a lack of 
decontamination facilities overall 
23,46
 and some identified factors which restricted capability 
to decontaminate effectively. These factors included equipment 
13,16,45
 and  knowledge 
relating to decontamination procedures. It was reported that decontamination knowledge was 
flawed in terms of how to carry out decontamination and the associated time scales 
13
. There 
was also a lack of knowledge in water flow procedures to prevent cross-contamination, 
clinical waste management, and the potential of cross-contamination in general 
5,45
. 
Personal Protective Equipment problems 
First receivers were found to hold negative perceptions of PPE finding it cumbersome – in 
particular ED nurses found difficulti s in donning PPE with specific limitations including 
poor suit fit, poor mask fit, claustrophobia, pregnancy, glasses or beard that prevents adequate 
mask seal, as well as respiratory or cardiovascular illness 
13,30,47
.  
Several papers identified PPE challenges for routine and lifesaving tasks including 
inadequate provision 
45
, poor fit, and  dexterity issues 
13,30,47
. Coping strategies were reported 
to include substitute equipment whilst wearing PPE for example prefilled (Aurum) syringes 
to administer intravenous drugs, instead of the traditional glass ampules and syringe method
47
. 
Another substitution was using a Laryngeal Mask Airway (LMA) rather than and 
Endotracheal (ET) tube to secure the patients airway if required 
41,48,49
. 
Table 3 
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Discussion  
This state of science review has systematically searched for, and reviewed research on the ED 
response to a CBRNe event. It has recognised the ED as a system which depends on key 
factors when responding to such an event. The themes - preparedness, response, 
decontamination, and PPE problems were identified as key factors based on research 
highlighting challenges, uncertainties, inconsistencies, and obstacles associated with the ED 
CBRNe response.  
In line with existing literature, this review highlights that first receivers are underprepared to 
respond to a CBRNe event as they would natural disasters
20,23,30,35,50
, resulting in the ED 
being underprepared effectively respond overall. An explanation is that the ED is a complex 
system consisting of organisational, technological, and individual factors, which is further 
complicated by multifaceted CBRN events.  Although it is  suggested that hospitals should 
implement policies to address the lack of preparedness
51
;  a  means of better understanding 
the ED as a system is by adopting a systems approach, which accounts for, and improves the 
design of a system and peoples interaction with it, rather than concentrating on an individual 
part of it 
52
. 
Further, first receivers display an unwillingness to respond to CBRNe events due to perceived 
risk, which has previously been associated with invisible hazards 
53
 associated with CBRNe 
events, and an unwillingness of staff to respond 
54
, resulting in staff shortages 
55
 
compromising an effective response. 
Additionally, literature based on response suggested that aspects such as surge capacity 
would be compromised as a result of limited interagency co-ordination 
21,36
. A suggested 
means of creating surge capacity is that of triaging patients efficiently. Effective triage was 
demonstrated through retrospective studies of explosive events 
39,56,57
. These studies 
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highlighted varying techniques of triage and how they impacted surge capacity and the care 
offered to patients. They also demonstrated that experience and expertise were often 
overcome by the overwhelming surge of patients.  
Studies based on decontamination, emphasised that it remained an area of ambiguity in the 
ED CBRNe response 
16
, particularly in terms of providing adequate facilities and equipment 
to perform decontamination 
13,45
. This disconnect is amplified by the incapability of first 
receivers to carry out decontamination, resulting from their lack of knowledge on how to 
carry out decontamination procedures 
5,13
. 
Studies identifying PPE problems highlighted the inadequate provision of PPE 
29,45
. This is 
further complicated by first receivers having limited knowledge about the application of PPE, 
finding it cumbersome, and having limited dexterity when conducting both routine and  
lifesaving procedures 
13,30,47
. Compensatory type studies focusing on overcoming PPE 
problems were prevalent. For example, a recent study which proposed the use of a lighter, 
size-specific PPE suit 
58
 which overcomes the physical constraints of PPE. The suggestion is 
that trial and error will continue until both routine and lifesaving tasks can be carried out in 
PPE competently and comfortably. 
On a local level, the findings from this review can be used to formulate a check sheet for ED 
disaster planners in order to enhance planning,  preparedness, and response to CBRNe 
events, as shown in Figure 3
†
. 
Figure 3 
 
Page 12 of 29
Cambridge University Press
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
For Peer Review
13 
 
†
 This checklist is entirely based on the literature included in this review. It is likely to have 
omissions, and should only be used in context of the presenting CBRNe situation combined 
with up-to-date governmental guidance. 
The findings from this systematic review can further be used to inform CBRNe guidance. For 
example, in the UK, The Health Protection Agency (HPA) 
59
 has published clinical 
guidelines on how to respond to CBRNe events in the ED. The HPA guidance explains how 
to safely clinically recognise, respond, and treat exposure which is dependent on presenting 
symptomologies.  Mnemonics for rapidly assessing casualties, triaging sieves, guidance on 
the type of PPE required as well as useful contacts are provided in this guidance 
59
.  The link 
between effective triage and surge capacity highlighted through this review can contribute to 
revisions of future HPA guidance. 
Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response (EPRR)
60,61
 is another initiative in the UK, 
providing guidance in CBRNe response. The guidance for self-presenters focuses on 
chemical exposure
60
 and is based on findings from the “Optimisation through Research of 
CHemical Incident Decontamination Systems” (ORCHIDS)
62
 project as its empirical 
framework to better respond to incidents involving hazardous materials. The guidance 
suggests rapid actions to save lives, known as the Initial Operational Response (IOR) to 
improve patient outcomes following CBRN exposure 
63
.  Findings from this systematic 
review can inform EPRR guidance to recognise first receivers decreased willingness to 
respond to unknown chemical exposure in comparison to known chemical hazards 
30
. 
Furthermore in order to implement the IOR, this review emphasises the need for appropriate 
facilities, equipment, and capability to carry out decontamination to be ready and available. 
With reference to the research question and the challenges of detection, decontamination, and 
diagnosis, this review found that research investment was being made in decontamination, 
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and the ORCHIDS project adds to this.  However, there were no specific studies on the 
detection or diagnosis of exposure.  In terms of the ED responding to self-presenters, this 
review found that the willingness to respond to CBRNe contaminated casualties’ decreases 
when the substance is unknown. 
Limitations 
The majority of the data used in this study was retrospective event based data which can be 
considered to jeopardise the scientific quality and validity of findings 
64
. However, 
retrospective event data particularly in disaster medicine is the norm. It is suggested that 
every systematic review faces challenges in terms of the quality of data collected
64
.  
There was also a geographical and publication bias with 20 of the 60 studies conducted in the 
US. This contributes to an acknowledged bias towards US literature as a point of reference in 
UK Health emergency planning and preparedness evidence 
65,66
 .  
Conclusion 
Understanding the key factors underpinning the dynamic ED system to plan, prepare, and 
respond to emergencies effectively has major legal, clinical, and moral implications. ED 
preparedness and response has obstacles, uncertainties and inconsistencies in addition to the 
known challenges. The four themes provide an evidence-based summary to inform future 
CBRNe guidance, policies, and clinical procedures. The themes particularly identify that the 
ED CBRNe response is limited unless response planning and preparation is considered at 
three levels: organisational (policies and procedures); technological (decontamination, 
communication, security, clinical care and treatment); and individual (willingness to respond, 
PPE, knowledge and competence). Further, the complexity of the ED, the multifaceted nature 
of CBRNe events combined with the identified concerns from this review, in terms of both 
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knowledge and behaviours suggests that a systems approach is required to understand the ED 
CBRNe response in the future.   
Figures & Tables 
Figure 1: Example of string searches  
Figure 2: PRISMA flow diagram of studies included in the systematic review 
Figure 3: Check sheet for ED disaster planners 
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Table 1: Search results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Database Results Review 
by title 
Review by 
abstract 
Abstracts in technology and engineering (ProQuest) 0 0 0  
ASSIA (NHS evidence) 1 1 0   
BNI (NHS evidence) 535 465 70  
Cambridge University press 245 230 60   
Chemical Database service 1 1 0 
Ergonomics Abstracts 0 0 0  
Google Scholar 331 305 66 
Health Management technology (EBSCO) 1 1 0  
Medline (Ovid SP) 217 204 53  
PsychInfo (EBSCO) 12 10 7  
Referex- Materials & Mechanical Engineering  2 2 0  
SAE- digital library-technical papers 0 0 0  
Scopus (Elsevier) 8 5 5  
Science Direct 406 400 71  
Toxline 15 12 4  
Web of Science 84 79 30  
Journals : Trends in analytical chemistry; Bioanalysis-
future science; Journal of Breath Research -IOP science; 
Biomolecular detection and quantification; Detection-
Scientific research 
15 16 0  
Total  1,874 1,730 366 
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Table 3: Primary, secondary, and tertiary findings  
Primary Findings 
4 key factors present challenges to the ED CBRNe response: 
 
1. Preparedness 
5,12,13,16,18,19,20,21,22,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33
 
The ED is a complex system consisting of organisational, technological, and individual 
factors which is further complicated by the multifaceted demands of CBRNe events, resulting 
in under preparedness 
 
2. Response
11,21,30,34,35,26,36,37,38,39,40 
Response is determined by first receivers willingness to respond to unknown CBRNe 
exposure and the organisational management of surge capacity  
 
3. Decontamination 
5,13,16,23,41,42,43,44,45,46 
Decontamination remains an area of ambiguity, amplified by first receivers lack of 
knowledge on decontamination procedures 
 
4. PPE problems 
13,30,41,45,47,48
 
Inadequate PPE provision, dexterity issues, and cumbersome fit results in PPE problems 
Secondary findings 
Response planning and preparation should be considered on 3 levels*: 
1.Organisational
5
 
- Policies and procedures 
 
2. Technological
12,22,26,31,32
 
- Decontamination
13,41,42
 
- Communication
27,28
 
- Security
12,22,31
 
- Clinical care
39,56,57
 
- Treatment
22,31,32
 
 
3. Individual
29,30
 
- Willingness to respond
34,35
 
- PPE
13,
 
41,47, 48,49
 
- Knowledge
30, 51
 
- Competence
30, 51
 
 
*Please see check sheet for ED disaster planners 
Tertiary findings 
1. Research on decontamination is being carried out 
 
2. No research on detection or diagnosis of exposure  
 
3. Self-Presenters 
First receivers willingness to respond to CBRNe contaminated casualties decreases when the 
substance is unknown
34,35
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